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Abstract 
 
Federalism, neo-functionalism and realism-intergovernmentalism offer different 
visions of European unity, evident in different European organizations such as the Council 
of Europe to the ECSC, EEC/EC/EU, and EFTA. The paper develops two heuristic 
schemes that help explain the success of the ECSC, EEC/EC/EU over other European 
organizations. The neo-functionalist initial success deeply influenced and shaped following 
developments. 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of European unity was much discussed after WWI (Agnelli and Cabiati 
1918; Einaudi 1918a and 1918b; Coudenhove-Kalergi 1923; the Briand’s Memorandum of 
1930; Lothian 1935; Robbins 1937 and 1941; Spinelli and Rossi 1941; see also Pistone 
1975; Mayne and Pinder 1990; Malandrino 1993; Burgess 1995; Malandrino and Pistone 
1999). However, it actually entered the political agenda after WWII (in Italy for example 
see the papers by the first President of the Republic Luigi Einaudi 1943, 1944, 1945, 1947a, 
1947b, 1948a, 1948b, 1956), also supported by several pro-European organization 
throughout Europe (Lipgens 1982 and 1985; Pistone 1992, 1996, 2008; Pinder 1989 and 
1990; Landuyt and Preda 2000). There were competing normative visions about European 
unity, both with regards to the institutional framework envisaged, and about the strategy to 
create it. From these visions different theories have developed which combine normative 
and analytic elements.  
The macro-theories that propose a comprehensive understanding of the process 
can be broadly grouped into three families: the realist or intergovernmental, the neo-
functionalist, and the federalist traditions (for an overview of the main theories cfr. 
Rosamond 2000). They revolve around the issues of what are the European Communities 
and then Union, what can/should it become, how can that outcome be achieved, by what 
dynamics, and by what actors. With the historical unfolding of the process they all had to 
deal with the reality of the process which challenged some of their main tenets, bringing 
about successive phases of theoretical revision for all theories (Castaldi 2005). They differ 
with regards to the identification of the key players in the process; the motives (economic, 
political, ideological) of their choices; the relationship between economic integration and 
the creation of supranational institutions and decision-making procedures; the dynamics of 
the process and the decision-making mechanisms that determine it; and the 
possible/desirable ultimate goal of integration.  
 Initially, the first fundamental divide among the main normative visions regarded 
what is unity and what is division. Federalism and neo-functionalism consider unity the 
ability to decide and act together. Therefore they put emphasis on the powers endowed to 
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supranational institutions and on their decision-making procedures. This suggests the 
possible complementarity of federalism and neo-functionalism as they shared the same 
goal, but proposed different strategies to reach it (see Dosenrode 2010 in this issue). 
Eventually, Mario Albertini explicitly tried to bridge the two, by proposing constitutional 
gradualism, founded on federal constitutionalism and neo-functionalist gradualist 
approach, which is not possible to analyse here in details (Albertini 1971-1999b, 1976-
1999b, 1984). Realism-Intergovernmentalism considers national sovereignty as an attribute 
which the nation-state will never renounce, and therefore the possible unity is provided by 
the greatest possible number of states deciding to cooperate together. Essentially, the 
challenge was between traditional international cooperation and a new form of integration 
aiming explicitly, if only within a long-term perspective, to a political unification.  
All visions were to a certain extent put in practice at the beginning of the European 
unification process, and this produced various international organizations with different 
institutional settings. The Council of Europe on the one hand, and the European Free 
Trade Area on the other, can be considered as the embodiment of realism-
intergovernmentalism. The Council of Europe was always characterised by a vast 
membership, an essentially intergovernmental structure, relatively limited competences, and 
little supranational powers. The European Free Trade Area combined a more limited 
membership with an essentially intergovernmental structure, important economic 
competences, and no supranational powers. The European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and its successors up to the EU can be considered the embodiment of neo-
functionalism, and also federalism to a certain extent (Dosenrode 2007). It started with 
only six members, relatively strong supranational powers and a pre-federal institutional 
structure. Some of these features and powers have been lost along the process, but some 
other have been acquired, as I will argue later on.  
This paper will look at the interaction among the various organizations – ECSC, 
then EEC/EC/EU, Council of Europe and EFTA - mainly trying to explain the dramatic 
prevalence of the unification process which started with the Schuman Declaration of the 
9th of May 1950 and proceeded up to the current European Union, over the other 
initiatives that brought about the Council of Europe and the European Free Trade Area. 
To this end I will briefly consider the start of the process towards some form of European 
unity, and sketch two explanatory schemes with regards to the main components and 
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dynamics of the process. These will be used to analyse the uneven development of the 
various European organizations and their interaction. 
 
 
1. The start of  the process towards European unity 
 
The first practical steps towards European unity were taken thanks to an external 
push, coming from the conditions attached by the US to the generous proposal of the 
Marshall Plan, signed in 1947 and implemented in April 1948 (Geremek 2008). American 
financial help to the reconstruction of Europe would not be provided to individual states, 
but only to a new European organization which would manage them to the benefit of the 
whole of Europe. This resulted in the creation of the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC). However, the European states turned it into the 
instrument to divide among themselves the American financial help. However, it had an 
important role as a compensation chamber for intra-European trade, at a time in which the 
availability of hard currency, namely dollars, was very limited – the so-called Dollar 
shortage (Kindleberger 1950). This organization essentially lost any purpose with the end 
of the Marshall Plan and was eventually superseded in 1961 by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), including the US. 
 The Hague Congress in May 1948 was organised to discuss among prominent 
politicians and public figures the issue of European unity. The federalist and 
intergovernmental visions were the main alternatives discussed, and the second prevailed. 
The result was the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, which represented the realist 
form of unity (Council of Europe 1999). It had a wide membership (initially 10 states, and 
now it has 47), a political nature, but very limited competences and power. It was basically 
an institution to favour cooperation among member states about human rights and political 
issues. The Parliamentary Assembly was considered the only institutional element which 
could be used to trigger a new dynamics to the organization, given the substantially 
intergovernmental character of the rest of the institutional set-up. Paul Henry Spaak, first 
president of the Parliamentary Assembly led the attempts in this direction, which eventually 
failed. Over time the Council of Europe managed to establish a useful and effective 
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European regional system of human rights protection, but it is definitely not at the core of 
the European unification process.  
 The impasse created by the failure of the Council of Europe and the absence of 
other initiatives, brought Jean Monnet to propose the creation of a supra-national 
community to manage the coal basins for which France and Germany had been fighting 
three wars in less than a century. He obtained the assent by the French foreign minister, 
Robert Schuman, and the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Finally Schuman 
publically proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community to Germany 
and all other interested European countries (Fontaine 2000), in the the Schuman 
Declaration of the 9th of May 1950. The proposal was explicitly presented as “the first step 
towards a European federation” (full text of the Declaration at 
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm) , and rested on the precondition of a 
willingness to devolve parts of sovereignty to the new supranational institution. Britain 
rejected this precondition, and after an initial status as observer, left the intergovernmental 
conference that led by Monnet drafted the Treaty establishing the ECSC between France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg (the Six). Compared to the 
membership of the Council of Europe, this was a smaller group of countries. 
 The ECSC was a fundamentally neo-functionalist form of European unity. It 
created an effective capacity to decide and act together, but very limited in scope, as it 
regarded a specific issue-area. However, its institutional structure was clearly pre-federal, 
coherently with the federal aim indicated by the Schuman Declaration. The decisions of the 
High Authority were cogent. It was to be controlled by the Council of Ministers 
representing the members states, and by a Parliamentary Assembly composed of delegates 
of the national parliaments – but it was foreseen the possibility for it to be eventually 
directly elected by the citizens. The ECSC had legal personality and substantial financial 
autonomy, as it could levy taxes on coal and steel production and trade and obtain credit 
on the international market – all these were not recognised to the EEC in 1957 and the EU 
has not yet been able to recover these fiscal powers, while it was recognised legal 
personality only with the Treaty of Lisbon.  
Following the start of the Korean war in 1950 and the American demand for West 
German rearmament, Monnet re-proposed the same ECSC scheme with regards to the 
defence policy-area. The Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a European Defence 
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Community (EDC). Spinelli convinced De Gasperi that a European army without a 
European government would be a danger for democracy and just a mercenary army for the 
US, and through art. 38, the project of a European Political Community (EPC) was linked 
to the EDC. The mandate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC - enlarged as to 
meet the requirement for the EDC one, and assuming the name of Ad Hoc Assembly to 
avoid the term “constituent assembly” - to draft a new Treaty-Constitution to establish the 
EPC was essentially an attempt to build a federal form of European unity. The end of the 
Korean war in 1953, Stalin’s death, and a series of changes in the French government – 
until Schuman’s party went into opposition and the Gaullist into government – contributed 
to the indefinite postponement of the EDC Treaty ratification at the French national 
assembly in 1954. The ambitious project of a political and military union felt on a 
procedural issue by a few votes in August 1954, due to the unusual alliance between 
Gaullists and communists on that issue (on the EDC see Lerner and Aron 1957; but the 
most detailed accounts are in Italian: Preda 1990, 1994, 1996). 
 The success of the neo-functional initiative, the ECSC, and the failure of the 
federalist EDC-EPC and of the intergovernmental Council of Europe, significantly 
determined the following path of the European unification process, and also the fate of the 
alternative integrative schemes. But to address these issues specifically it is first needed to 
sketch two heuristic schemes to analyse the European unification process. These 
conceptual schemes exploit the strengths of the main theories, although they were first 
sketched within the federalist tradition. The first concerns the distinction between 
construction, integration and unification, to conceptualize a dynamic relationship between 
the transfer of competences at European level and the creation of supranational 
institutional mechanisms. The second scheme "Crisis-Initiative-Leadership" helps to re-
define the actors and their logic in a more open but specific fashion, and to explain the 
timing of the successes and failures of the European unification process. Together they will 
help analyse the development of the different integrative schemes and their relationshipsI.  
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2. The components of  the process: construction, integration, 
unification 
 
Mario AlbertiniII distinguishes between construction, integration and unification to 
focus on and conceptualise the main aspects of the process (see especially Albertini 1963, 
1986a and 1986b). 
The concept of "unification" refers specifically to the political process related to the 
progressive overcoming of absolute national and exclusive sovereignty through its transfer 
or pooling with regard to a defined and limited number of issues at the European level. 
This is the general concept to capture the historical significance (from a long term 
perspective) of what is usually called European integration process. The unification, 
therefore, includes both the gradualist phase and the possible and eventual decision to set 
up a European federal state. The historical significance of the process was the unification 
of several States and is based on two aspects: the integration of competences and the 
construction of supranational institutions. Unification is conceived as a function of the 
transfer of competences from the national to the European level (integration) and the 
building of institutions and decision-making mechanisms to manage these responsibilities 
(construction). 
The term "integration", whose semantic connotation refers to something 
technocratic should be used instead to focus on the competences attributed at the 
European level, which historically have been accumulated mainly through a process of 
economic integration along an essentially neo-functionalist path. The decision to create the 
common market, the common agricultural policy, the single market, the single currency, 
the area of internal freedom, the foreign and security policy, and then the foreign, security 
and defence policy, are all examples of integration. 
The term "construction" indicates the process of institution building in Europe, 
which can be analyzed by using constitutional or federal criteria. Its semantic connotation 
refers to the element of planning and political will necessary to "build" Europe, i.e. its 
institutions and decision-making mechanisms, or its powers. The direct election and then 
the extension of the powers of the European Parliament, the introduction and then the 
extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, the creation of the European Central 
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Bank, and other aspects related to decision-making and to the institutional structure of the 
Union are examples of institutional construction. 
Moravcsik proposed a similar view, using different terms. He distinguishes between 
the “substantive agreement” - reached in one of the “grand bargains” characterizing the 
stages of the process - on economic issues (policies, funding, etc.) and the “institutional 
choice” that is always subordinate and functional to the first and essential agreement (see 
especially his systematic book Moravcsik 1998). He gives priority to the integration, the 
establishment of policies and the transfer of expertise and possibly resources, compared to 
selected institutional choices, although acknowledging that the element of novelty 
characterizing the Community and then the Union was its own framework institutional.  
On the contrary, Albertini argues that the level of construction is the key variable to 
assess the unification process, because the achievement of certain objectives, including the 
economic ones, is not possible without an adequate institutional framework, sufficiently 
democratic and efficient. According to Albertini, the degree of institutional construction 
determined the degree of possible integration, as shown by the failure of the positive 
integration in an inadequate institutional framework, and later the need for the introduction 
of qualified majority voting, that is the overcoming of the unanimity and national vetoes, in 
order to create the single market – this last point being widely shared in the literature by 
intergovernmental and neo-functionalist scholars as well. 
I contend that there is a continuous and complex interaction between integration 
and construction, and that none of them can be considered as a dependent variable of the 
other (see also Castaldi 2005 and 2009a, and Montani 2008). The fact that appropriate 
decision-making institutions sufficiently strong and legitimate from a democratic point of 
view are necessary in order to achieve shared substantive goals has been historically 
proven: for example the introduction of majority voting in the Council, provided by the 
Single European Act of 1986 only with regard to the creation of the single market, was 
clearly linked to the objective of establishing the Single market by 1992. This required the 
adoption of over three hundred directives, and their approval was unthinkable to be 
reached through unanimity. Nonetheless, most deliberations have then been taken 
unanimously, because when QMV applies, all states have an incentive to cooperate in 
drafting the bill, and not to be outvoted. Conversely, when there is unanimity, there is less 
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willingness to compromise because each government can block any decision that does not 
satisfy its demands. 
At the same time, the history of the process also shows the opposite case of aspects 
of the institutional construction that have triggered other changes both at the level of 
construction and integration. Two examples are particularly relevant. The creation of the 
Court of Justice with a binding jurisdictional power has led to an expansion of Community 
competences and powers through the jurisprudential affirmation of the principles of 
implied powers and of the primacy and direct applicability of EU law. Similarly, the direct 
election of the European Parliament has triggered a process of continuous and progressive 
increase of the Parliament’ powers during all subsequent Treaties amendments. Moreover, 
the initiative of the Parliament with the approval in 1984 of the draft Treaty of European 
Union, also known as Spinelli Project (Lodge 1984), was essential to trigger a process of 
reform of the 1957 Treaties which has never been stopped since then, and produced the 
re-launch of the integration process through the Single European Act, while many of the 
provisions of the Parliament project have been introduced by subsequent treaties 
amendments (Burgess 1989 and 2000; Bonvicini 2010). 
Obviously, the interaction between construction and integration takes time. They 
are like two columns on which unification is based. If they are not developed symmetrically 
a dynamic tension arises. But improvements can be made on each of them first. This 
distinction also helps to focus on the long-term generally progressive, but not linear, trend 
of the unification process. Generally, when a new competence is attributed to the 
European level – i.e. a new step of integration is made – it is handled through essentially 
intergovernmental procedures. Only when some positive result is achieved on the one 
hand, but not all potential advantages are ripped due to the constraints of unanimity, a 
communitarization of the relevant decision-making procedure takes place.  
The 1957 Rome Treaty provided for a transitory period in which unanimity applied, 
before establishing QMV. The Empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise 
prevented this, and the establishment of a complete European market had to wait until 
1992, after QMV was introduced in 1986. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty provided for the 
creation of the monetary union, and for the first time attributed to the EU new 
competences in the fields of foreign policy justice and home affairs – the so-called second 
and third pillars – on strictly intergovernmental terms. Many scholars, especially 
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intergovernmental and neo-functionalists, suggested that the Treaty checked the progress 
of supranationality reinforcing the intergovernmental character of the EU. This was a 
short-term, and short-sighted view, disconfirmed by the fact that all subsequent treaties up 
to Lisbon have progressively extended the use of QMV, the co-decision procedure of the 
Parliament, the role of the Commission and the justiciability by the Court of Justice also in 
these fields, up to the abolishment of the three pillars structure.  
All this shows the usefulness of the distinction between integration and 
construction within the unification process. A significant increase in competences or power 
alone is likely to trigger a dynamics in favour of an increase in the other element too. 
Historical evidence suggests that none of them can be considered as a dependent variable 
of the other, but that adequate attention must be devoted to their interaction.  
From this perspective it is easier to discern the long-term trends of the process. 
Compared to the 1950 ECSC, the 1957 EEC had wider competences and more limited 
powers, as it lacked legal personality and the financial powers attributed to the ECSC, and 
the Commission was weaker than the High Authority. This can to some extent be 
attributed to the disarray of the federalist position after the collapse of the EDC in 1954. In 
the early 1960s the Court of Justice strengthened the institutional framework by 
establishing the direct effect (Van Gend en Loos, 1963) and primacy (Costa/ENEL, 1964) 
of the EEC law. The “empty chair” crisis produced the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise 
which prevented the foreseen introduction of QMV in the Council at the end of the 
transitory period of the Common Market, as provided by the 1957 Treaties. The 1970s are 
often considered a period of euro-sclerosis, but there were at least four major 
developments, such as the creation of the European Council in 1973, the decision to hold 
direct election of the European Parliament in 1974, the Court of Justice establishing the 
implied powers principle (ERTA, 1976) and the creation of the European monetary system 
in 1979. The EP approval of the Spinelli initiative in 1984 was crucial in triggering an IGC 
which brought about the 1986 Single European Act, which expanded both competences 
and powers of the EC. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty greatly increased the competences, and 
the powers with regards to the goal of monetary union. All following Treaties slightly 
increased the competences and progressively communitarised those acquired at Maastricht, 
thus strengthening, in different degrees in various fields, the EU powers. Overall, the trend 
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towards an increase of competences and powers is quite evident. It remains to be analysed 
how such a dynamic was triggered. 
  
3. The timing and the actors of  the process: crisis-initiative -leadership 
 
The distinction between unification, integration and construction helps to clarify the 
fundamental aspects of the process and their interaction, and starts shedding some light on 
the dynamics of the process. However, it tells us nothing about the timing and actors of 
the process. The main theories have all major difficulties in explaining the timing of 
European unification, and each privileges different actors, such as national governments, 
European institutions – especially the Commission – and federalist personalities and 
organizations.  
The tripartite scheme focused on the concepts of crisis, initiative and leadership - 
which I will briefly analyze in each of its aspects and in their interactions – helps to explain 
the timing of the process and the different roles played by the actors on which the various 
theories focus. For a decision advancing the unification process to be taken these three 
conditions must be present at the same time. This heuristic tool was first sketched by 
Albertini, reflecting about the role of the federalist organization, (see Albertini 1965, 1966, 
1968, 1973, and 1979 - each article usually focusing on one aspect in particular), in light of 
Monnet and Spinelli political struggles (Monnet 1976; Spinelli 1989b, 1989c, 2006; see also 
Castaldi 2009b). 
I consider a crisis a socially perceived supranational problem which cannot be 
solved by any European nation-state acting alone. The crisis constitutes a catalyst for a 
decision, and it essentially determines the area or sector in which an integrative proposal 
can be proposed with a chance of success. The initiative is the proposal of a solution to the 
crisis via an advancement of the unification process – which implies a transfer of 
competences and/or of powers to the European level. Leadership is the power to put the 
proposal on the official agenda and build the consensus among the governments to 
approve and apply it. Each element can be considered as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a decision about European integration to be taken. Not all crises will be 
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followed by adequate initiatives, nor all such initiatives will be matched by successful 
European leaderships.  
 
3.1. Crisis 
 
The idea that crises are windows of opportunity to push European integration 
forward is prominent in the writings of some of the most prominent European 
personalities (Monnet 1976; Spinelli 1979, 1984, 1987, 1989a, 1992a, 1992b). Actually, 
according to the federalists, the basic push of the European unification process was linked 
to the historical long-term crisis of the nation state - already discussed by Rossi and Spinelli 
in the Ventotene Manifesto in 1941 - that is the impossibility for the European nation-
states to ensure their economic development and security by themselves (Spinelli discusses 
it in several papers now collected in Spinelli 1991). These goals required states 
characterized by a vast extension as shown by the success of the U.S. and the USSR, the 
two super powers that divided the world and Europe into spheres of influence, up to 
determining the domestic regime of the states under their hegemony (Castaldi 2002).  
This structural situation manifested itself through the existence of supranational 
problems. Occasionally they turned into socially perceived serious crises on specific issues, 
which Albertini called “crisis of national powers” (on the two concepts of crisis of the 
nation state and of national powers see Castaldi 2001; and Sam-Sang Jo 2007). A similar 
view is proposed by realist authors who consider the European integration as a mere 
instrument of nation-states to solve some common problems in the economic and political 
fields that cannot be faced by a single state (see Milward 1984, 1992, and Milward et al. 
1994). The difference is that the federalists consider the crises of national power as 
symptoms of the historical crisis of the nation state, and therefore identify in the European 
federation a structural solution. 
When dealing with a supranational problem states normally seek the way of mere 
cooperation, as the intergovernmental tradition argues. For this reason a socially perceived 
crisis on a supranational problem is necessary for states to decide and carry out a transfer 
or pooling of sovereignty – provided the European and federalist personalities and 
organizations had the ability and strength to pursue that proposal (Albertini 1965 and 
1966). The crisis may involve a nation state or the Community and the European Union as 
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a whole. When the EU plays a decisive role in dealing with certain problems a crisis of the 
EU itself can trigger a set of opportunities to re-launch the integrative or disintegrative 
dynamic. 
The importance of the social perception of the crisis, or a single problem and its 
supranational character has to be underlined. The American request for West German 
rearmament during the Korean War can be regarded as a minor crisis, because after the fall 
of the EDC the creation of a German army was carried out without major tensions with 
France, also thanks to the collocation of both within the Atlantic framework. But the idea 
of a German army was socially perceived as a serious danger and this allowed to propose 
and bring to the verge of ratification the creation of a European army. On the contrary, the 
crisis of Bretton Woods was very serious and provoked tremendous damages to the 
European economy, but the project of monetary union failed in the seventiesIII, and it was 
carried out only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in order to anchor the reunited Germany to 
Europe, by the Europeanization of it main element and symbol of power, the Deutsche 
Mark. 
The concept of crisis has a fundamental theoretical value. The crisis of national 
powers is called upon to explain the windows of opportunity and therefore the timing of 
the debates, choices, and the stages of the process of unification. The crisis functions as a 
catalyst for decisions, and thus marks the time of the unification process. Moreover, it is 
the nature of the crisis which determines the type of possible decisions, and eventually 
progress or regress of the unification process. 
The crisis related to the American request of German rearmament explains both 
the time and the military character of the proposal of a new Community - and the fact that 
a personality like Monnet, often (wrongly) considered a neo-functionalist, has proposed the 
creation of a European army or a transfer of sovereignty on the point of greatest potential 
national resistance. Confronted with a crisis on the military field he could not respond with 
an economical solution, just as the collapse of Bretton Woods was followed by the project 
of monetary union, rather than a revival of the idea of military integration, which again re-
emerged during the Convention at the time of the second Iraqi war, bringing about the 
provisions about structural cooperation on defence in the Constitutional Treaty and then in 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
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Finally, the notion of crisis can clarify the role of various actors, which can vary 
during the process. The role of European and federalist figures and organizations depends 
on their ability, at a given time, to identify the supranational problem on which a socially 
perceived crisis could break out, and thus to mobilize consensus around proposals aimed at 
advancing the unification process to solve at least partially these crises. If they manage, 
these actors have a role and their proposals enter the public debate. If they don’t, they 
disappear from the political scene. Similarly, in the absence of a crisis their propaganda 
activities are unlikely to lead to decisions involving a real advancement of the unification 
process, with regard to the transfer of competences - integration – and to the institution-
building and the strengthening of supranational decision-making mechanisms - 
construction. 
All this means that no one - including the federalists personalities and 
organizations, notwithstanding what Milward and Moravcsik attribute them - believes that 
nation-states can decide about the transfer of sovereignty for ideological reasons, i.e. for 
the sake of European unity as an ideal. On the contrary, a favourable ideological vision is 
only a necessary but not sufficient condition for a national leader to take decisions 
regarding a transfer of competences or powers, when this choice is the best solution to 
respond to a crisis. An ideological nationalist vision, instead, does not allow to take such a 
decision, notwithstanding the costs of the missed solution of crisis. The differential of 
economic growth, unemployment levels and inflation rate between the European states 
and the United States after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system showed the cost of 
the failure to reach monetary unification in the seventies, especially when compared to the 
positive effects on the European economy of the creation of the euro. 
The crises are therefore a necessary condition - for reasons explained by 
intergovernmental analysis about the normal inclination of national governments not to 
transfer competences and/or powers to Europe - but an insufficient one, to advance the 
process. The crises - which are not determined by the actors voluntarily, although their 
social perception is also linked to their behaviours - offer windows of opportunities that 
require the active intervention of actors to be exploited. Their role is examined through the 
concepts of initiative and European (occasional) leadership. 
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3.2 Initiative 
 
The second element of the conceptual scheme developed to understand the 
dynamics of the process is thus the initiative. Facing a crisis it is possible to provide 
different answers, more or less effective and with a different relationship between costs 
and benefits for different groups involved. Obviously, not all answers will involve any 
progress in the European unification process. To this end it is essential that someone takes 
the initiative to develop and propose solutions to the crisis involving such an advancement. 
Since governments typically seek the way of mere cooperation, this role is more easily 
embraced by federalist personalities and movements, or by European institutions, that 
would benefit from a solutions strengthening them. The role of Monnet, Spinelli, and the 
organizations that supported them, has often been to identify clearly and precisely the 
supranational character of the crisis, and then propose solutions that involved a 
strengthening of the unification process (see Albertini 19667 and 1968). Quite the same 
applies to the role of the Commission as highlighted by the neo-functionalist literature 
(Haas 1958-1968, and 1963; Lindberg 1963, 1967, 1970, and 1971; Schmitter 1969 and 
1971; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991), or of the Parliament 
(Lodge, 1984; Albertini 1984 and 1986a; Spinelli 1985). 
The concept of “initiative” identifies the role of ideas in the process, similarly to 
what was recently emphasized by social constructivism. Monnet’s idea of pooling 
sovereignty on coal and steel - a specific and limited sector, but essential to international 
relations, since it was the base of the military heavy industry of the time – was different 
from simple cooperation and less demanding than a complete political union. This idea 
determined the start and also some of the ensuing characteristics of the entire unification 
process. However, every step of the process was conceived and proposed in relation to the 
crises of the period. The idea of European political unity seemed so distant and difficult, 
that European governments were initially ready to create a European army, without a 
European democratic government, until Spinelli pointed out the inconsistency and the 
danger of a similar project (Albertini 1977b). For each step of the process it is possible to 
identify the personalities and/or institutions that first devised a proposal and began to 
gather consensus around it. 
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3.3. Leadership 
 
 Ideas and proposals - even if consistent and well grounded - need to be 
transformed into concrete decisions. Therefore, the issue of power emerges significantly 
once again. Only if a national government or a European institution develops, or endorses 
a proposal initiated by other personalities, and inserts it the political agenda, this has a 
chance of being adopted. The political leader who puts a proposal into the agenda and 
builds the necessary intergovernmental agreement for the final decision de facto exercises a 
European leadership - even if it is a national leader or government. Still, it is an occasional 
leadership, linked to the desire to solve the crisis through the integrative proposal. 
Otherwise, if it was due to the simple desire of unifying Europe, it would manifest itself in 
a continuative manner.  
On this basis it is possible to develop the concept of “European occasional 
leadership” (Albertini 1973 and 1979). The idea of the occasional nature of the leadership 
connects it to the crisis from a theoretical point of view, explaining why it is not possible 
for any national leader to devote priority to European integration, as personalities such as 
Monnet and Spinelli did – but their role was that of the initiative rather than of leadership. 
Intergovernmentalist literature has often stressed that the national leaders involved in 
important integrative decisions were moved by the desire to solve problems and thus 
strengthen the power of the nation-state rather than by the will to unite Europe. 
Intergovernmentalists also harshly criticize the hagiographic literature concerning those 
who Milward calls the "European Saints" (Milward 1992, especially pp. 318-344; and 
Moravcsik 1998). The concept of the European occasional leadership actually incorporates 
the correct aspect of this criticism, while acknowledging the role and the European 
function in certain phases played by national leaders. Of course, an ideological inclination 
favorable to European unity is still necessary in order assume such a role favoring solutions 
to crises that advance the unification process. 
A fourth aspect should be added to this scheme - crisis, initiative and occasional 
European leadership - namely the permanence of those conditions for all the duration of 
the decision-making and ratification procedure of a given proposal. If the socially perceived 
crisis is solved or the social perception of the problem lacks or diminishes, or whether the 
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occasional European leadership is missing, the initiative that linked these two elements will 
hardly have a positive outcome. For example, in the fall of ECD both of these situations 
took place: when the French National Assembly voted, the war in Korea was over and 
Stalin’s death had eased the climate of confrontation with the USSR, and several 
governments of different partisan composition took turns causing the exclusion of both 
Pleven and Schuman – who initially provided the European occasional leadership - from 
the government. 
This fourth aspect is obviously very relevant for the effective results of decision-
making, but not for the conceptualization of the conditions with regard to the evolution of 
the process. The scheme crisis-initiative-leadership aims at identifying the conditions under 
which national governments may accept a transfer of competence and/or powers to 
Europe. This scheme develops the paradox proposed by Spinelli of the nation-states as 
obstacle and instrument of the unification process (see Castaldi 2010). Under normal 
circumstances, the Member States represent the obstacles of the unification process, 
because they attempt to maintain its sovereignty. However, faced with a socially perceived 
crisis on a supranational problem, and an effective initiative to solve it by advancing 
European unification, a European occasional leadership may emergence in at least one 
Member State or in the European Union institutions, triggering a decision-making process 
which, although dominated by the states, can lead to an advancement of the process of 
European unification. 
 It may be useful at this point to summarise the two heuristic schemes proposed so 
far to identify the main components and potential actors of the process.  
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Table 1. Elements of the process. 
 
Integration Construction Unification 
Transfer of competences to 
the European level. 
Transfer of powers to the 
European level, through the 
creation of institutions, 
decision-making procedures 
and implementation 
mechanisms. 
It express the long-term 
political significance of the 
process, and derives from 
the interaction of integration 
and construction, none of 
which can be considered as 
a dependent variable of the 
other. 
 
 
Table 2: Roles, potential actors, and conditions for a new decision within the unificiation 
process to be taken. 
 
Crisis Initiative Leadership Permanence 
A socially perceived 
problem, which 
cannot be solved at 
national level. This 
opens a window of 
opportunity for a 
European decision. 
It can emerge within 
the domestic or 
international 
environment, on 
economic or 
political issues. It 
determines the 
Political 
entrepreneurs - 
especially European 
personalities and 
movements – can 
propose a European 
solution to a crisis, 
through a transfer 
of competences 
and/or powers to 
the European level. 
Personalities such as 
Monnet and Spinelli 
and institutions such 
Foreign Ministers, 
Head of State and 
governments who 
push forward the 
initiative into the 
official political 
agenda and gather the 
intergovernmental 
consensus necessary 
for a decision to be 
taken. 
The permanence of 
the previous three 
elements for the 
time necessary to 
reach a decision is 
crucial. If the crisis 
is solved differently, 
or if the leadership 
is undermined by a 
change in 
government, a 
decision is unlikely 
to be reached. 
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political space and 
sector of new 
integrative initiative. 
as the Commission 
and the Parliament 
played this role. 
 
 
4. The success of  Monnet and Schuman’s initiative and its influence 
 
Depending on the intensity, social perception and area of the crisis, different 
opportunity were available for the strategies proposed by the different theories at the 
beginning of the process. For several specific reasons, the neo-functionalist initiative 
proposed by Monnet and officially put forward by the Schuman Declaration was the only 
successful one (see Albertini 1977). It spelt the beginning of the unification process and 
deeply influenced its later development through path-dependence. On the one hand it 
provided the basic institutional design for the following communities. On the other it 
shaped the way European unity is conceived by the political class, the intellectual elites, 
mass media and public opinion. All this helped similar gradualist ideas to be taken up when 
a new crisis arose, notwithstanding the availability of other integrative ideas, even in areas 
where gradualism implied higher costs than a one-stroke decision – such as monetary 
union. 
The ECSC success was due to several reasons. First, it was a significant proposal in 
the face of the failure to exploit the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly to push 
forward the unification process. Second, it sidelined the national diplomats, jealous guards 
of national sovereignty: Monnet convinced Schuman that the Quai d’Orsai would have 
watered down the project, and only the French Foreign and Prime Ministers knew the 
exact content of the proposal which was preliminary presented to Adenauer, before being 
brought to the whole French Cabinet, and straight away presented to the world by 
Schuman in the famous press conference on the 9th of May 1950. Furthermore, the very 
Intergovernmental Conference which followed was organised and managed in a very 
unusual manner by Monnet himself (Monnet 1976). Third, it made a specific proposal, but 
also indicated the long term aim of the process, explicitly presenting it as “a first step 
towards a European federation”. Coherently, it put the willingness to devolve part of their 
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sovereignty to a European authority as a pre-condition to start the negotiations. This was 
an extremely significant testimony of the resolve to go ahead decisively without being 
prevented by the less willing states. This eventually brought to the impossibility for Britain 
to join this initiative. Finally, the institutional design of the ECSC had a clear pre-federal 
structure (Pistone 2010), as highlighted by Monnet in his first speech as President of the 
ECSC High Authority - initially drafted by Spinelli (Spinelli 1989a) - which provides a clear 
expression of how the European elites understood the new Community at its inception: 
 
For the first time, the traditional relations between States are now transformed. Under the 
methods of the past, even when European States are convinced of the need for common 
action, even when they set up an international organization, they retain their complete 
sovereignty. Thus the international organization can neither make decisions nor carry them 
out, but can only make recommendations to the States. These methods cannot eliminate 
our national antagonisms; as long as national sovereignty is not surmounted, such 
antagonisms can only be aggravated. 
But today, six Parliaments have decided after careful deliberation, by substantial 
majorities, to create the first European Community which merges a portion of their 
respective national sovereignties and submits it to the common interest. 
Within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty, the High 
Authority has received from the six States a mandate to take decisions with complete 
independence, decisions which immediately become effective throughout their territory. 
The Authority obtains its financial resources, not from contributions by the States, but 
from direct levies on the industries under its control. 
It is responsible, not to the States, but to a European Assembly. The Assembly was 
elected by the national Parliaments, but it has already been provided that it may be elected 
directly by the people. From the beginning, the members of the Assembly are not bound 
by any national mandate; they vote freely and individually, not by national blocs. Each of 
them represents not his own country but the whole Community. The Assembly controls 
our activities. It has the power to refuse us its confidence. It is the first European 
Assembly endowed with sovereign powers. 
The acts of the High Authority are subject to review. But such review will be not 
by national courts, but by a European court, the Court of Justice. 
Any of these institutions may be changed and improved in the light of experience. 
What cannot be challenged is the principle that they are supra-national – in other words 
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federal – institutions. They are institutions which are sovereign within the limits of their 
competence – that is to say, which are endowed with the right to make decisions and carry 
them out. (Speech available at http://www.ena.lu/) 
 
The High Authority was essentially a government, responsible to the Parliamentary 
Assembly - which could eventually become directly elected - and the Council of Ministers 
could vote by majority on certain limited issues. The ECSC had the power to levy taxes and 
to contract debts – a power that was not recognised to the following Communities, and 
which the EU is still lacking – and its decisions were immediately valid on the citizens. A 
principle extended to all Community law, thanks to the principle of primacy affirmed by 
the European Court of Justice.  
However, coal and steel represent only a part of economic life. For this reason 
there must be continual liaison between the High Authority and the Governments which 
are still responsible for the overall economic policy of their States. The Council of 
Ministers was set up, not to exercise control and guardianship, but to provide this liaison 
and to assure the coordination of the policies of the High Authority and those of the 
member States.  
The declared federal aim, and the quasi-federal institutional structure were 
prominent aspects in the success of the neo-functionalist initiative, just as of the British 
refusal to join it. This quasi-federal character of the ECSC institutional framework had a 
fundamental impact on its ability to cope with following crises, including in pushing 
supporters of European unity to respond to crisis with proposal aimed at strengthening 
this specific regional integration scheme. An analysis of the various crises which brought 
about new integrative decisions and the consequent enlargement of the competences, the 
powers, and the members of the European Communities and then Union is out of the 
scope of this paper, but it would help to identify a wide range of important actors at 
political and economic level, and also the importance of path-dependence in the 
development of the unification process (Castaldi 2005; see also Sidjanski 2000). 
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5. The Council of  Europe and the EFTA developments and their 
relationships with the EEC/EC/EU 
 
The Council of Europe was set up in 1949 among ten states - including Britain, but 
without West Germany which joined in 1950 - after the The Hague Congress of 1948. It 
was the result of the victory of the confederal vision of Britain over the federal one. The 
attempt to use the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to foster new 
integrative step towards European unity essentially failed, and the need to take an 
altogether different path soon emerged. The Council of Europe with time managed to 
establish an effective and praised regional system of protection of human rights. Beside this 
achievement, it remains essentially a forum for dialogue among states about culture, 
democracy, and cooperation in general, with little specific competence and no powers. 
Precisely these characteristics have made membership little demanding, and the Council of 
Europe has now 47 member states.  
Somehow the Council of Europe can be considered as a European UN, but with 
less important competences – the UN Security Council being attributed significant ones in 
the field of security – and very little power. The Schuman Declaration can be interpreted 
also as a declaration of the failure of the Council of Europe to become a vehicle of 
European unity, because of its structure and its membership. This forced those willing to 
pursue that goal to create anew another organization, with limited but specific competences 
and power, and endowed with an institutional structure capable of development, the 
ECSC. 
The British refusal of the Schuman Declaration proposal, accompanied by the 
following success of the ECSC and the launch of European Economic Community was at 
the basis of the birth of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). With a retrospective view 
it is possible to consider EFTA as a significant failure. EFTA was established in 1960 
among seven countries, explicitly as a response to the EEC creation by the Six in 1957 (see 
EFTA website 
http://www.efta.int/~/media/Files/Publications/Fact%20sheets/General%20EFTA%20
fact%20sheets/efta-50-years.ashx). So much so, that membership in one excluded 
membership in the other. Unlike in the EEC, where no single state alone was able to 
 .    E-  
 
101 
exercise a clear leadership, the UK role in the establishment of EFTA was certainly crucial. 
EFTA had a clear economic purpose, and was explicitly developed simply as a form of 
cooperation among the seven member states, without any pooling or sharing of 
sovereignty, and with a minimal institutionalization.  
EFTA institutional weakness - compared to the EEC – clearly contributed to its poor 
economic performance. The growth rate of the EFTA countries, and Britain, remained 
significantly lower than EEC countries (Milward 1992: 396), providing a strong incentive to 
join the EEC. Eventually the UK, Denmark and Ireland managed to join the EEC in 1973 
- after De Gaulle lost power in France, and thus stopped preventing British entry – and left 
EFTA, which began making a series of agreements with the EEC. Eventually most EFTA 
members joined the EEC/EC/EU and left EFTA. With the creation of the European 
Economic Area in 1994 - which essentially extended the Single Market to most EFTA 
Countries, which would have to observe the EU relevant legal norms, even if they do not 
take part in the relative decisions (Switzerland is still not part of the EEA, but signed 
bilateral agreements with the EU in 1994 and 2004) - EFTA survives as a sort of waiting 
room for countries with a significant domestic opposition to joining the EU, but 
economically unable to do without the single market.  
At its birth in 1960 EFTA had seven member states, compared with the EEC six. 
Today EFTA is left with only four rather small member states - Liechtenstein, Iceland, 
Norway, and Switzerland – while the EU has reached 27 members. As an alternative 
integrative scheme, and thus implicitly opposed to the EEC, EFTA failed. The European 
Communities were born earlier, and their policy towards both the Council of Europe and 
EFTA was essentially of benign neglect. The economic performance of the EEC was 
enough to make it a catalyst and a core of European unification, de facto emptying EFTA 
of much of its significance, a process substantially completed with the creation of the 
European Economic Area.  
The weakness of EFTA institutional framework, and the explicit absence – if not 
refusal – of the goal of European unity, in favour of mere cooperation, made it an unlikely 
candidate as an instrument to respond to crises. When a supranational crisis arose, nobody 
tried to answer it by proposing a strengthening of the EFTA. Even the personalities and 
groups in favour of European unity within EFTA countries, worked to push their 
countries into the EEC rather than to reform the EFTA, as the British case suggests 
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(Pinder 1996). While its establishment was a response to the creation of the EEC, it did not 
manage to become a serious competitor.  
 Their survival shows the resilience of institutions, even after they have fulfilled – or 
failed to fulfil – the aims for which they were created in the first place. But their weakness 
suggests that when an integration scheme is established in an area, the mere cooperation 
schemes in the same area have a difficult life ahead. The Council of Europe reached 
significant result with the creation of a European human rights protection system. 
However, most European citizens know about the EU, but not about the Council of 
Europe, which is the first European organization born as the symbol and instrument of 
European unity.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The experience of the different integration and cooperation schemes in Europe 
provide several insights about potential dynamics among a plurality of regional 
organizations under a given figurational structure (Elias 1978). I assume that all such 
schemes were different symptoms of the crisis of the European nation-states and of the 
need for European unity, defined and pursued in different ways. This helps drawing some 
tentative lessons from their development and relationships. 
First, the federalist and neo-functionalist definition of unity definitely won the 
intellectual struggle with the realist-intergovernmentalist one. The supranational character 
of the ECSC, and then EEC/EC/EU was the main reason for their establishment as the 
main instrument of European unity, and for the marginalization of all other cooperation 
schemes. The pre-federal character of the ECSC institutional framework had a 
fundamental impact on its ability to ensure higher economic performances than alternative 
cooperative schemes. This eventually made possible for pro-European personalities and 
organization to try to exploit the recurrent crises to foster an enlargement of the 
competences, the powers, and the members of the European Communities and then 
Union.  
Second, to be the first established organization, and to have the wider membership 
is not a necessary ingredient for prevalence, otherwise the Council of Europe should be the 
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main locus of regional integration, which clearly is not. Unity is not the willingness to 
cooperate by the wider number of states keeping their absolute sovereignty intact. The 
hopes appointed upon the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly at its 
inception were quickly disappointed. The resilience of this organization and its ability to 
develop a useful regional system of human rights protection cannot overshadow its limited 
political role. 
Third, an International Organization competences alone do not define the 
prospects for its development. The EEC and EFTA had similar competences and aims, 
but had very different developments, which can only be accounted for by considering their 
institutional structure and their long-term purpose. A focus on competences, or 
integration, only is not enough. This highlights the importance of the element of 
institutional construction, which brings us back to my previous considerations about the 
dynamic interaction between integration and construction, none of which can be simply 
considered as the dependent variable of the other. Unification stems from the interaction 
between the transfer of competences and powers. The lack of adequate institutional 
construction is a crucial explanatory factor of the relatively little success of EFTA. 
 Fourth, the continued existence of the Council of Europe and EFTA alongside the 
EU can be taken as a proof the resilience of institutions. Even weak organizations, which 
substantially failed to reach their initial aim, managed to stay alive. This lesson can be 
applied also with regards to all innovative institutional decisions taken within the EU. Once 
a new organ or decision-making mechanism is established, it becomes almost impossible to 
get rid of it. This is interesting because there are several instruments foreseen by the 
Treaties which have not yet been used. The Lisbon Treaties provide several ones: from 
structural cooperation on defence, to the new power recognised to the Parliament and/or 
the Commission to propose amendment to the Treaties on which a new Convention can 
be convened by simple majority. Others have been established long ago, and still wait to be 
exploited if need there be, such as the so-called “Benelux clause”, which allows for deeper 
forms of integration among some member states – without setting any requirement about 
how many – which was initially introduced to provide for the integration process among 
the Benelux countries. The idea of a political avant-garde within the EU finds here a 
potentially suitable juridical mechanism. 
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Fifth, the emergence of one integration scheme, the EU, as the main and dominant 
one, has made possible a transformation of the others, and also the development of new 
specific ones, with a subsidiary role. On the one hand, EU prevalence has deeply 
transformed EFTA from an aspirant competitor into a partner and a potential waiting 
room. On the other, the resilience of unanimity for Treaty amendment and the 
unwillingness of some member states to any further pooling or sharing of sovereignty on 
certain issues, brought to the establishment of ad hoc agreements among certain EU 
members states, such as the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which was then absorbed within 
the EU through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.  
Sixth, this pattern of circumventing the unanimity rule by inventing new legal 
instruments is actually quite recurrent. This was the case for the direct election of the 
European Parliament, which were opposed by, and thus not initially foreseen for, the UK 
and Denmark. Most important of all it applied to the decision about the creation of the 
single currency at Maastricht: faced with British opposition to the project, the other 
countries responded with the invention of the “opting-out” clause, in order to proceed. 
This clause was then used again on several occasion, with regards for instance to the Social 
Charter and later to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although its effectiveness in front 
of the judgments of the European Court of Justice seems rather weak. This suggests that 
when there is a socially perceived crisis and a strong initiative and leadership on the ground 
legal constraints can be overcome by political will. It is ultimately very difficult on crucial 
issue for any country to prevent other to go along a path on which they agree to be 
committed. This is telling at a time in which the Eurozone is clearly in a crisis, and 
substantial reforms would require an anonymous modification of the Treaties also by EU 
member states outside the Eurozone. 
Seventh, the role of several kinds of agents, from national to European institutions, 
personalities and organizations in different significant moments of the European 
unification process suggest that any theory indicating only one set of actors as the main or 
crucial one in any occasion cannot grasp the complexity of the process. In this context the 
heuristic scheme crisis-initiative-leadership helps conceptualise the different roles played by 
different actors – each of them usually emphasised by one of the main integration theories 
– along the process. This also suggests the importance of social expectation with regards to 
the evolution of each integration or cooperation scheme. The fact that the ECSC was 
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originally presented as “the first step towards European federation”, while the Council of 
Europe and EFTA were built on the principle of national sovereignty and of traditional 
international cooperation thus played an important role. Pro-European personalities and 
movements focused their efforts on the strengthening of the ECSC, and then 
EEC/EC/EU, rather than on the other cooperation schemes. And even the pro-European 
within countries outside the dominant scheme campaigned to bring their country in rather 
than to strengthen the alternative schemes. 
I believe that the two explanatory schemes employed in this paper can help shed 
light on several aspects of the European unification process. They can be tested with 
regards to the main integrative and disintegrative decisions. And their potential heuristic 
value with regards to other regional integration schemes remains to be tested too. 
Therefore, they open up a wide research agenda for the future, which can help bridge the 
useful insights of the main European integration grand theories, within a complex, but not 
contradictory theoretical framework (Castaldi 2005). 
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